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This paper analyzes the effects of immigration on the size and quality of public ed-
ucation using a quantitative political economy model that allows for a heterogeneous
immigrant population. Our analysis distinguishes between short and long-run effects
and accounts for the consequences of naturalization and assimilation. We use the model
to analyze Spain’s large 2000-2008 immigration wave. We find that immigration led to
a 15% increase in public enrollment in the short run, together with a 3% reduction in
public education spending and almost a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of na-
tive households using private schools. Depending on the eventual degree of assimilation,
these trends will be greatly intensified or mitigated once immigrants naturalize and gain
the right to vote. Our analysis suggests that assimilation in terms of family size and
the value assigned to children’s education are the most relevant dimensions quantita-
tively. We also show that immigration policies that favor one group over another can
significantly alter the overall effects of immigration on the schooling system.
JEL Classifications: D7, F22, H52, H75, J61, I22, I24
Keywords: Education, Immigration, Naturalization, Assimilation
∗We benefitted from insightful comments by Antonio Cabrales, Daniele Coen-Pirani, Matthias
Doepke, Shin-ichi Fukuda, Kyle Hyndman, Max Steinhardt, Weina Zhou and seminar participants
at CUNY, Dalhousie University, University of Tokyo, University of Tsukuba, Development Bank of
Japan, and Tokyo Labor Economics Workshop. This project is partly supported by the Grant-
in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Grant num-
ber: 24330077). E-mail (URL): lidia.farre@ub.edu, (https://sites.google.com/site/lidiafarre78/home),
, fortega@qc.cuny.edu, (http://qcpages.qc.cuny.edu/∼fortega), ryuichi.tanaka@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp,(https://
sites.google.com/site/ryuichitanaka/home).
1 Introduction
Public education is one of the pillars of modern democracies. Besides educating voters
so that they can delegate policy-making to effective politicians, public education plays an
important economic role by helping rein in income inequality, facilitate upward mobility,
and foster economic growth.1
For these reasons ensuring sufficient funding for high-quality public education is a fun-
damental policy issue in every country. From a political economy perspective, the key
determinant of the quality of public education is the income distribution of voters and
their preferences over public education. These preferences depend, in turn, on the choice
to send one’s children to tuition-free public schools or to private ones (Epple and Romano
(1996b)). As a result of this feedback between policies and individual choices, shocks to
voters’ preferences may propagate into unexpectedly large changes in the quality of public
education.
Rapid demographic changes can operate as one such shock. Specifically, when a coun-
try experiences a large immigration wave its domestic politics are likely to be profoundly
reshaped, with wide-ranging consequences for public policies and the welfare state. In par-
ticular, there are a number of ways in which immigration may affect education policies. On
the one hand, despite large disparities across immigrant groups, it is often the case that
immigration tends to lead to a disproportionately large increase in enrollment in public
schools, given the younger age of immigrant households, their higher fertility, and their
relatively lower average income. This may lead native voters to change their preferences
over the level of resources devoted to public education (Freeman (1986)). On the other
hand, immigrants eventually affect the politics of the host country, either directly when
they become naturalized (and gain the right to vote), or indirectly when forward-looking
politicians cultivate their favor in anticipation of their enfranchisement (Ortega (2005)).
In an influential study of the effects of immigration on the education system, Coen-Pirani
(2011) argues that the large immigration wave experienced by California between 1970 and
2000 may have been responsible for a 24% reduction in the quality of public education,
measured by spending per student in public schools, and a reduction in the share of native
students enrolled in public schools.
Naturally, the effects of immigration on the education system of the host country depend
1See, for instance, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Galor and Zeira (1993), Fernandez and Rogerson
(1996), Gradstein and Justman (2002), Blankenau et al. (2007), Takii and Tanaka (2009) , and Takii and
Tanaka (2013), among many others.
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crucially on the characteristics of the immigrant population, such as their income (Dottori
et al. (2013)) and their aspirations and attitudes toward education (Goyette and Xie (1999),
Hsin and Xie (2014)). Thus it is important to recognize that the immigrant population is
rarely a monolithic entity. Instead it is often composed of multiple groups, that vary by
country of origin, skills, demographics, cultural affinity to the host country, and potential
for assimilation. As a result the effects of immigration are likely to differ substantially across
immigration episodes. This also raises the possibility of conducting immigration policies
that favor some countries of origin or groups of immigrants over others, as is often the case
with former colonies.
Likewise some features of the education system in the host country may also mediate
the effects of immigration on voters’ support for public education. One such feature is the
cost incurred by households that want to send their children to private schools. In some
countries private schools charge very high tuition and can only be afforded by an affluent
minority. For instance, average private school tuition in the U.S. in 2007-2008 was $8,549
(18 percent of GDP per capita in that year).2 In other countries governments subsidize
private schools, keeping tuition affordable to a large swath of the population. For instance,
in that year the average annual private school tuition in Spain was below 500 euros (2
percent of GDP per capita).3
This paper provides a new quantitative framework to assess how immigration affects
the education system of the receiving countries. We present a political economy model of
school choice a la Epple and Romano (1996b), adapted to the analysis of immigration as in
Coen-Pirani (2011). Compared to the literature, our framework has three novel features.
First, we allow for heterogeneity within the immigrant population in order to capture the
large disparities in the school choices of Spanish immigrants on the basis of their country of
origin. Importantly, this feature enables us to evaluate the effects of alternative immigration
policies that favor some immigrant groups over others. Secondly, in line with the experience
of Spain and several other countries, we assume that private schools are subsidized by the
government, although they may also charge tuition.4 Finally, we provide a comprehensive
2Table 63 in the Digest of Education Statistics 2010, National Center for Education Statistics. Includes
elementary, secondary and high school. On average the tuitions charged by elementary, secondary, and high
schools were $6,733, $10,549, and $10,045.
3In Spain in year 2007 average tuition in subsidized (concerted) schools was 260 euros and in fully private
schools was 2,223 euros (Family Expenditure Survey), with wide regional variation. In that same year
enrollment in the former was 88 percent of the combined enrollment in concerted and fully private schools
(elementary and secondary education combined). As a result the average annual tuition in private schools
(concerted or not) in Spain in 2007 was 476 euros.
4Subsidized private schools, often referred to as charter schools, are fairly ubiquitous. Countries differ in
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analysis of the effects of immigrant assimilation. In particular, we distinguish between
economic, demographic and cultural assimilation and quantify the effects of assimilation
along each of these dimensions. By highlighting the dimensions of assimilation that are
quantitatively more important, and by identifying the immigrant groups that are at a
greater disadvantage in terms of those attributes, these findings are crucial in order to
design cost-effective policies that enhance assimilation.
We focus on the recent experience of Spain, which experienced a large-scale immigration
episode between the late 1990’s and 2000’s. In 1998 its foreign-born share was about 3
percent but rose by 10 percentage points over the course of a decade. Immigrants from a
wide variety of countries were attracted to Spain because of its robust economic growth,
with important consequences for Spain’s labor market (Farre et al. (2011), Gonzalez and
Ortega (2011)). The period of rising income and labor demand came to a halt in 2008
when the Great Recession and the subsequent austerity measures plunged the economy into
a severe slump. A defining feature of Spain’s education system is the large role played
by private schools, which account for one third of the overall enrollment in compulsory
education.5 Underlying the high popularity of private schools among Spanish households
is the large subsidy that most private schools receive from the government, which allows
these schools to charge fairly low tuition (Arellano and Zamarro (2007)). While not unique
to Spain, the presence of a subsidy to private education has not been taken into account
in previous quantitative analyses of the effects of immigration on the education system.
Thus one contribution of our work is to examine how the presence of the subsidy affects
the political economy of public education and the effects of a large immigration wave.
In our benchmark we calibrate the model to match key moments of Spain’s economy
and education system in year 2008, at the end of the immigration wave. In line with
the Spanish experience we assume that immigrants have access to free public schools and
subsidized private schools, and pay taxes, just like natives. However, they are not allowed to
vote in the short run. In the long run immigrants are naturalized and can directly influence
the outcome of elections. In the long run these naturalized immigrants also experience some
degree of assimilation in terms of income, number of children, and preferences for education.
First, we focus on the short-run effects of immigration. To do so we simulate a counter-
the degree of subsidization. For instance, charter schools are found in the United States, Australia, Chile
and Colombia. Versions of charter schools are also present to varying degrees in European countries such
as the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and Norway. Thus extending the previous models by including
subsidized private schools makes them more in line with the educational system in many countries.
5In the United States private schools account for only 10 percent of the overall enrollment in pre-university
education.
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factual economy where we assume that the immigrant population in Spain had remained
as in year 2000. By comparing this scenario to the benchmark for year 2008, we isolate the
short-run effects of the 2000-2008 immigration wave. These effects arise from the increased
demand for schooling by the immigrant households and their contribution to the public
coffers through taxes. Our results reveal that the arrival of immigrant households had an
effect on the education policy preferred by the median voter and on the school choices of
native households. Immigration was responsible for a 3 percent reduction in the quality of
public education, measured as public spending per student, and a large overall increase in
the size of public education. The latter is the result of the large inflow of immigrant children
into public schools, only partially mitigated by native flight away from public schools.
Second, we turn to medium-run effects arising from the enfranchisement of immigrants.
To do so we consider a counterfactual scenario where the immigrant population in year 2008
is naturalized, but does not assimilate, and compare it to the 2008 benchmark. Since, on
average, immigrants in Spain had lower income than natives, the median voter shifted down
in the income distribution. As a result we find that naturalization is associated with an
additional 7 percent reduction in public spending per student, and further native flight out
of public schools. If, pessimistically, one believes that the immigrant population in Spain
will not experience any assimilation then the combined long-run effect is given by the sum
of the effects of immigration and assimilation. In this case the overall public spending per
student will eventually fall by over 10 percent and there will be substantial native flight
toward the private system. Specifically, the share of native households using public schools
will decrease by 3 percentage-points.
Third, we turn to the effects of assimilation, gauged by comparing the previous natural-
ization scenario to alternative scenarios where the naturalized population assimilates along
each of several dimensions. Assimilation is associated to increases in the quality of public
education (in terms of public spending per student) and a reversal of native flows back
toward public schools. It is helpful to report the effects of the combined long-run effects
under the optimistic assumption that immigrants fully assimilate.6 In this case the quality
of public education would turn out to be slightly higher (by about 1 percent) than if the
2000-2008 immigrants had not migrated to Spain. In response to the enhanced quality, the
share of native households using public schools would increase slightly, and overall enroll-
6These figures are the sum of the marginal effects of immigration, naturalization, and full assimilation.
Naturally, in reality immigrant assimilation will most likely fall somewhere in between the two extremes
reported here. But we find it useful to report the full range of outcomes. The existing empirical evidence
suggests that incomplete assimilation is in fact the norm (De la Rica et al. (2015)).
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ment in public schools would eventually be 16% higher than in the absence of immigration.
Our results also indicate that the most important dimension of assimilation is cultural, and
has to do with gaps in the preference for education relative to natives. Based on our cal-
ibration, Asian immigrants display the smallest gap along this dimension whereas African
immigrants display the largest disadvantage. Naturally, the final degree of assimilation
along each of the relevant dimensions is an empirical question, and will vary depending on
the success of integration policies. We also use our model to conduct immigration policy
experiments that are useful to evaluate the effects of favoring some groups of immigrants
over others, a common practice in many countries. Our results suggest that the effects can
vary substantially and may differ depending on the time horizon of interest.
Finally, it is also interesting to evaluate the role played by the subsidy to private schools,
a key feature of Spain’s education system. To do so we simulate the model eliminating the
subsidy. Not surprisingly, we find that without the subsidy the native share in public
schools would be 85 percent, far higher than the actual (65 percent), and public education
spending per student would be slightly higher than without the subsidy. Most important
for our analysis, we also examine how the availability of the subsidy mediates the effects
of immigration. We find that while the level of public enrollment would be much higher
without the subsidy, the effects of immigration would be largely unchanged except for a
slightly larger native flight toward private schools.
Besides the work of Epple and Romano (1996b) and Coen-Pirani (2011), our paper is
also related to studies that evaluate the effects of immigration on the size of government.
Razin et al. (2002) argue that immigration is likely to lead to lower redistribution because of
a ‘fiscal leakage’ effect. Along these lines, a recent empirical study by Speciale (2012) finds
that immigration flows into European countries are associated with a reduction in public
spending. Somewhat in opposition to these papers, the theoretical arguments in Ortega
(2010) suggest that when voters are foresighted immigration may be key in order to sustain
political support for income redistribution.
Our work is also related to Dottori et al. (2013) who theoretically characterize opti-
mal immigration policies that take into account the effects of immigration on the school
choices of natives. Their main finding is that the optimal policy is highly biased in favor
of skilled immigrants. A recent study by Albornoz-Crespo et al. (2011) presents a model
of endogenous migration at the household level where school quality and student outcomes
are determined endogenously. In their model the key dimension of heterogeneity is parental
motivation toward their children’s education and they analyze which immigration policies
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produce positive selection along this dimension. Our model also incorporates these dimen-
sions of household heterogeneity, which play an important role in the quantitative evaluation
of the impact of immigration on education policy.
Our paper is also related to Bearse et al. (2013) who analyze setups with heterogeneous
households that can choose between public and private schools, and to studies that empha-
size heterogeneity among immigrant populations, as in Borooah and Mangan (2007) and
Desai et al. (2009). To the extent that ethnic heterogeneity in a society may affect trust,
our paper relates to Daniele and Geys (2015) and Bergh and Bjornskov (2014) who argue
that trust facilitates the adoption of welfare state policies that reduce income inequality.
Our results suggest that immigration may increase income and ethnic segregation in schools
unless assimilation takes place, which may result in increased income inequality. Our work
is also related to the literature on how the use of public services by immigrants, relative to
natives, affects attitudes toward immigration, as in Miguet (2008), Huber and Oberdabernig
(2016) and Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Romero (2016).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a concise description of the
Spanish schooling system. In Section 3, we report summary statistics. Section 4 presents
a simple theoretical framework based on the model by Epple and Romano (1996b). In
Section 5 we explain our calibration strategy as well as the data for the calibration. Section 6
presents the results of our analysis regarding the short, medium, and long-run effects of
immigration on the school system. Section 7 exploits the novel features of our model to
simulate the effects of alternative immigration policies that would favor one immigrant
group over another. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Background: the Spanish Education System
Compulsory schooling in Spain is composed of two stages: six years of elementary (primary)
school and four years of secondary schooling (known as E.S.O, or Compulsory Secondary
Schooling in its Spanish acronym). As a result, students are required to be in school between
the ages of 6 and 16.7 Beyond compulsory schooling, pre-university education also includes
two years of Bachillerato, which prepares students for college, or alternatively occupational
training (Formacion Profesional).
Between years 2000 and 2009 public spending in education in Spain increased year after
year. In 2009 the overall public spending in education was 52.5 billion (109) euros, 4.98%
7However, it is very common to begin school at age 3: in the academic year 2010-2011 the enrollment
rate for 3-year olds was over 96 percent.
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of GDP. The largest share of these funds are devoted to pre-university education (62.3% in
year 2009).8 A large share of the budget is used to directly finance public schools, which are
free of tuition. But a sizable amount is also devoted to subsidizing private elementary and
secondary schools (5.9 billion euros in 2009, about 18 percent of the pre-university public
spending). As a result of the affordable tuition, private schools account for a large share
of the student body in Spain. In academic year 2009-2010, about 1/3 of the pre-university
students were enrolled in private schools. In comparison in the US the share of students
in private schools is about 10 percent (National Center for Education Statistics, academic
year 2009-2010).
The vast majority of private schools in Spain are subsidized by the government and are
known as ‘concerted’ schools.9 In exchange for government funding that supposedly covers
the school’s whole salary bill, concerted schools agree to conduct an admission policy on the
basis of the same criteria as public schools and to closely follow the core curriculum of public
schools. Concerted schools account for almost 90 percent of the private-school enrollment.
The remaining students attend private schools that are not subsidized and therefore charge
much higher tuition.
While, in theory concerted schools are not allowed to charge for tuition, in practice
there are quasi-compulsory payments required from parents in terms of donations to the
parents’ association, building maintenance or financing of extracurricular activities. Ac-
cording to a 2012 study by the Association of Spanish Consumers (OCU (2012)), over 90%
of concerted schools require payments that are perceived by households as compulsory. The
average annual payment was 501 euros, much lower than the tuition charged by fully private
schools.10
In practice there are important differences between public and private schools. First,
some evidence points to better student outcomes in standardized tests in private schools,
followed by private concerted schools, and last by public schools (Trillo del Pozo et al.
8Financing for public universities accounts for 20.7% of the budget. The source for this data is the report
‘Datos y Cifras - Curso escolar 2011/2012’ by the Ministry of Education.
9Concerted schools were introduced in 1985 to accommodate the increasing demand for education that
resulted from the baby boom and the increase in compulsory schooling age, and the majority are Catholic.
For more details see Arellano and Zamarro (2007) and Farre et al. (2015).
10In some neighborhoods in Barcelona and Madrid, students’ families’ payments in concerted schools can
be as high as 200 euros per month. More systematic evidence is available in the 2007 supplement to the Family
Expenditures Survey, which reported average annual household expenditures per student disaggregated by
type of school. Focusing on expenditures in tuition (upfront or as monthly fees) and extracurricular activities
taking place within the schools, the average expenses per student in compulsory secondary school in public,
concerted, and private schools were, respectively, 10 euros, 260 euros, and 2,223 euros.
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(2006)).11 Second, the share of immigrant students in public schools is much higher than
in private schools. In part this may be due to the larger out-of-pocket household expenses
but it is also possible that the emphasis on Catholic education in concerted schools is an
important deterrent for immigrant households with a different religious background.12
3 Summary statistics
Let us begin by illustrating the impact of immigration on the Spanish schooling system.
Between year 2000 and 2010 the population of students with foreign nationality increased
by a factor of 5.4, from 141,916 to over 770,384 students.13 The rise in this segment of
the student population was very rapid until 2008 (when it reached 755,587 students) and
has plateaued since then, reflecting the sharp reduction in immigration flows as the Great
Recession hit the Spanish economy.
The impact of immigration on public and private schools has been very uneven. In year
2000 the share of foreign students in public and private schools was similar (2.3 and 1.4
percent, respectively). By 2008 the corresponding figures were 11.9 and 5.6 percent (Spanish
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports). That is, approximately a 10 percentage-point
increase in public schools compared to barely 4 in private schools. It is worth noting that
this uneven expansion of enrollment in public and private schools in response to immigration
is not due the concentration of immigrants in rural areas with no private-school options.
Rather, the data suggest the opposite case. The data show that the immigrant population is
disproportionately located in urban areas, where the availability of private schools is larger
(see Figure 1).
The immigrant population in Spain is very diverse in terms of origin. In 2010 the
breakdown of the foreign student population by origin was as follows: 40% originated from
South and Central America, 29% from the rest of Europe, 23% from Africa, and about 6%
from Asia. Among all of these students, the vast majority are in public schools (82%), with
the remainder being accounted for by concerted schools (14%), and only 4% in fully private
11What is less clear is whether the source of the differences is due to sorting in ability and family back-
ground or to the value-added provided by the schools. For instance, Calero and Escardibul (2007) and
Anghel and Cabrales (2010) find that differences in performance between public and concerted schools are
largely accounted for by parental background.
12De la Rica and Ortega (2012) report that 11 percent of the foreign-born population in Spain in year
2008 originated in Morocco. Adding also other immigrants from majority Muslim countries or followers of
other religions leads to an important share of the immigrant population that may be disinclined to attend
Catholic schools.
13Importantly, these figures do not include students that have double nationality or second-generation
immigrant children so it underestimates the impact of immigration on the schooling system in Spain.
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schools. In comparison, the breakdown for the overall student population, including native
students, is approximately 68%, 27%, and 5%, respectively.
The inflows of immigrants may affect not only the size but also the quality of education.
Between the years 2000 and 2010, increasing government funding has led to a general re-
duction in student-teacher ratios, a commonly used proxy for the quality of education (16
percent). However, this quality improvement has been much more muted in high immigra-
tion regions. Farre et al. (2015) document that the reductions in student-teacher ratios have
been much smaller in regions that have experienced a large increase in their foreign-born
share over the decade. This is illustrated in (Figure 3).
We next present some of the main variables that our analysis will focus on. The data have
been collected from numerous sources, combining administrative education data provided
by the Ministry of Education with a variety of household-level surveys. Details on the data
sources and on the construction of these variables are collected in Appendix A.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for years 2000 and 2008. The latter is the
key year used in the calibration of our model since it corresponds to the end of the wave of
immigration received by Spain.14 Between years 2000 and 2008 Spain experienced robust
economic growth, with real GDP increasing by 32 percent in this 8-year period. This
was the continuation of an economic expansion that had begun in the early 1990s. This
economic bonanza, combined with troubled economies in some low-income countries with
ties to Spain, led to a large immigration wave. Between 2000 and 2008 the working-age
population in Spain increased by almost 15 percent, or about 4 million individuals due to
immigration. Between 2000 and 2008 the foreign-born share of the population increased by
almost 10 percentage points, reaching 13 percent in year 2008.
In our paper, households are the main unit of analysis. Between years 2000 and 2008,
the number of households in Spain increased by almost 35 percent (3.3 million), with a
large share of the increase being driven by immigration. In 2008 the Spanish economy had
12.7 million households and about 13.8 percent of all households where headed by a foreign-
born individual. Besides its large size, this immigration wave was characterized by its wide
variation in terms of country of origin. In terms of countries of origin, Romania, Ecuador,
Morocco and China are the main countries in each group (De la Rica and Ortega (2012)).
For our purposes, it helps to subdivide the immigrant population in four groups according
to the continent of origin. Between 2000 and 2008, the number of households headed by
14Between 2008 and 2013 the Spanish economy has suffered a severe recession that has led to net population
outflows.
9
an immigrant from Europe increased from 1.38 to 5.09 percent of the overall number of
households. Similarly, the number of immigrant households with American origin (North,
South and Central) increased from less than 1 percent to 5.62 percent of all households
in year 2008. Though also sizable, the increases in the numbers of households headed by
Africans and Asians were much smaller, reaching 2.62 and 0.48 percent of all households,
respectively, in year 2008.
The data also show that immigrant households had lower income than native households,
though the differences were relatively small In year 2008 the average native household earned
28,715 euros, about 9 percent more than the average immigrant household.15 However, this
masks substantial heterogeneity across immigrant groups in education levels. De la Rica
and Ortega (2012) report that the share of the population (males, age 25-50) with at most
primary schooling was 63% among Moroccans, 41% among Eastern Europeans, and 33%
among Latinos, compared to just 18% among Spanish natives.
Not surprisingly, differences in socio-economic status are also mapped into differences
in the share of students in each group attending public schools. As reported in Table 1, the
share of native students enrolled in public schools in year 2008 was 65 percent, compared
to 83 percent for immigrant children. Among these, the public school enrollment share
ranged from 75 percent for Asian children to 90 percent for African children. It is also
interesting to note that the overall share of students in public schools increased by 3.5
percentage points between years 2000 and 2008, from 66.2 to 69.7 percent. Among natives
the share of students enrolled in public schools actually fell by 1 percentage point in this
period. Therefore the overall increase in the share of students in public schools is due to
a composition effect: the large increase in immigrant children combined with their higher
propensity to attend public schools.16
Let us now turn to public expenditure in education. Adding all education levels, public
expenditure in education reached 4.58 percent of GDP in year 2008 (50.9 billion euros). This
is a significant improvement since year 2000, when it was 4.35 percent of GDP, and leaves
Spain just below the average of the European Union (27 member states) which was about
5 percent in year 2008. Given our focus on compulsory schooling, it is more relevant to
report the spending that corresponds to pre-university education only in Table 1. Spending
in pre-university education in year 2000 amounted to 2.70 percent of GDP, and increased
15The data for year 2000 cannot be disaggregated by nativity because the Family Expenditure Survey
only identified immigrant households from year 2006 onward.
16In addition there has been an increase in the public school shares for all immigrant groups between years
2000 and 2008.
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to 2.93 percent in year 2008. Spending in subsidizing private schools, which is about 18
percent of all pre-university spending, also increased as a share of GDP over these years.
4 The Model
In this section, we extend the school choice model developed by Epple and Romano (1996b)
along two dimensions. First, we introduce household heterogeneity in preferences for educa-
tion. This was also a feature of the extension proposed by Coen-Pirani (2011), who allowed
for parameter heterogeneity between natives and immigrants. We extend the model fur-
ther by allowing for group-specific parameters within the immigrant population in order to
accommodate the wide diversity of Spain’s immigrant population.
Our second point of departure is that our framework includes a public subsidy to private
schools, which is a defining feature of the Spanish education system. As we have seen in
Section 2, the Spanish education system is characterized by high enrollment in private
schools compared to other countries, driven by the highly subsidized tuition in most private
schools.17
4.1 Set up
The economy is populated by a unit measure of households that differ in income (wealth)
y, number of children n, country of origin m, and in their preference for education relative
to consumption. Native households are indexed by m = 0, and m = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,M denotes
immigrant households from origin country m.
Households derive utility from consumption c and from the per-child units of education
received by their children, E. We assume that all children in a household attend the same
school. The utility function is given by:







where α < 1, γm > 0, and λ > 0. While γm is a preference parameter for education that is
common to all households from the same origin country, λ allows for heterogeneity across
households within the same origin group. These terms will allow us to match differences
across groups in their educational investments over and above those induced by differences
in household income and household size.
17As will become clear later, formally the subsidy to private education renders our model more similar to
the so-called ‘topping-on’ education models, while Coen-Pirani (2011) and Epple and Romano (1996a) are
‘opting-out’ models of school choice.
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There are two types of schools: public and private. All public schools are homogeneous
in quality, that is, children attending any public school receive e units of education. In
contrast there is a range of private schools of varying quality. All private schools receive a
per-student subsidy from the government, denoted by b ≥ 0, which can also be interpreted
as a private education voucher. In addition households pay tuition z ≥ 0, which together
with the subsidy determines the education units (quality) of private schools, given by b+ z.
We also assume that both natives and immigrants are eligible to send their children to
tuition-free public schools and to subsidized private schools, in line with the institutional
arrangements in Spain. Finally, we assume that public expenditure in education, which is
the sum of direct expenditure on public schools and the subsidies to private education, is
financed with a linear tax s on household income y.
Conditional on sending children to public school, the household’s indirect utility is given
by:







which is increasing in disposable income and in the quality of public education. We also
note that the number of children in the household does not enter into the previous equation
because households derive utility from the per-child units of education.
Conditional on private school, households choose their preferred school among a range
of options indexed by the quality premium relative to public schools z. As a result, the
household’s indirect utility is given by:








where pmz is the tuition per student in group m. We refer to pm is an origin-specific ‘price’
of education. This parameter allows us to consider the possibility that because of, say,
language barriers, children of a particular immigrant group may require a larger investment
in order to acquire the same units of education as a native child in the same school. Within
private schools this means that this child’s parents have to spend more in order to provide
their child with the same education units as a native child.18 Symmetrically, we assume
that the same costs of education for each group m apply to public schools as well. That is,
there are no technological differences between public and private schools.
18We acknowledge that it is not entirely realistic to assume that schools charge different tuition to different
groups of students. However, we follow Coen-Pirani (2011) and make this assumption on the basis of its
convenience. At any rate, our baseline model will assume that pm = 1 for all m.
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4.2 School choices given policies
The education policy in this economy is summarized by the tax rate used to finance public
education expenditures (s), the quality of public schools (e), and the subsidy received by
private schools (b).
Inspection of equations (2) and (3) reveals that there exists an income threshold ŷ(n, s, e, b, λ,m)
above which households send their children to private school. To derive this threshold, note
that, conditional on choosing a private school, the utility-maximizing school chosen by the
household is given by:














Thus calling a school private if it has strictly positive tuition (z > 0), households with
higher (disposable) income or a higher taste for education will choose better private schools
(i.e., higher z > 0). In contrast, households with more children or facing a higher ‘price’ of
education will choose relatively worse (but cheaper) private schools (lower z > 0).
The threshold level of income of private school choice depends on the relative size of the
quality of public education (e) and the amount of private education subsidy (b). In many
empirically relevant cases, the amount of private education voucher does not exceed the
quality of public education: b ≤ e. In this case, the threshold is determined so that sending
children to public and private schools are indifferent: u(ŷ(1 − s), e, 0, λ,m) = V (ŷ(1 −
s), n, b, λ,m). This income threshold depends on the household’s number of children (n)
and on it’s preference for education relative to consumption (γmλ) as well as the quality of
public education and the subsidy received by private schools. Application of the implicit
function theorem reveals that this threshold is increasing in the quality of public education
(e) and in the tax rate (s), and decreasing in the private school subsidy (b).
When the amount of private education voucher is set at the level of the quality of public
education (b = e), it is straightforward to derive an expression for the threshold income
ŷ(n, s, e, b, λ,m):








where b = e. Note also that under the assumption of α < 0, which is the empirically relevant
range, the threshold is increasing in the number of children in the household (n) and the




Let f(y, n, λ,m) denote the joint density of income, number of children, idiosyncratic
preference for education, and country of origin.20 For a given public education policy (s, e),









nf(y, n, λ,m)dλdy. (6)
for m = 0, 1, 2, . . . .





where nm is the total number of children from origin m. Naturally, if we let h(n,m) =∫
y
∫
λ f(y, n, λ,m)dydλ denote the joint probability of n and m, we can compute the total
number of children in each group by nm =
∑
n nh(n,m).









pm(nm − npubm ) = sȳ (7)
where ȳ is the average (and total) household income and, thus, the right-hand side is the tax
revenue. The left-hand side contains the two entries in the government’s education budget.
The first term is the direct expenditure needed to finance public schools with quality level
e. The second term is the cost of subsidizing students in private schools at a rate b per
student. Symmetrically to private schools, we allow for differences in the cost of educating
children across the different groups (pm). Of course, we can always focus on scenario pm = p
where the cost of educating children is the same across all groups.
As noted earlier, an education policy consists of three variables, (s, e, b). One of these
variables is pinned down by the government’s budget constraint. Yet it is still the case that
the voting problem (described below) is intractable without further restrictions. In order
to make progress we link the level of the subsidy to the quality of public education. In
particular, we assume that the (private education) subsidy per student is set at the same
level as the spending in public education per student: b = e.21 One implication of this
assumption is that we are ruling out non-subsidized private schools. However, this type of
19In the case with b > e, all households choose “private” schools and thus ŷ(n, s, e, b, λ,m) = 0. Alterna-
tively, applying our definition of private school with a strictly positive z, we have the threshold income level
exactly same as in (5).
20The use of the term “density” is an abuse of terminology because y and λ are continuous (income and
preference for education) whereas n and m are discrete (number of children and country of origin). This
should be interpreted as probability density function when referring to the continuous random variables and
as probability distribution function when referring to the discrete random variables.
21More generally, we could consider that b = φe, where φ ≤ 1.
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schools accounts only for about 5 percent of the student population in Spain. Regarding
the level of the subsidy, equal to the spending per student in public schools, we believe this
feature to be rather realistic in the context of Spain where many private schools are heavily
subsidized and set a very low tuition.22
4.3 Majority-vote equilibrium
Public education policy is determined by majority voting.23 In our baseline model we as-
sume that only natives vote, but both natives and immigrants pay taxes and are eligible
to enroll in free public school and to receive the subsidy for private education. We define a
majority voting equilibrium in a standard fashion.
Definition: (s∗, e∗, z∗(y(1− s∗), n, λ,m), n∗m) is a majority-voting equilibrium if (i)
z∗(y(1−s∗), n, λ,m) is chosen optimally; (ii) the government budget constraint (7) is satis-
fied; (iii) the number of students in public schools for each groups is given by equation (6);
and (iv) the equilibrium tax rate and education services per student (s∗, e∗) are preferred by
at least 50 percent of the voters (natives) to any alternative feasible policy in any pairwise
comparison.
It is relatively easy to characterize the preferred tax rate for each household. Let us
consider first households with children in private schools and in a high income bracket. It
can be shown that for households with income y > y+(n,m) ≡ pmn∑
m pmnm
ȳ, the preferred tax
rate is zero.24 This is not surprising since these individuals do not use public schools. They
would prefer a world with zero taxes where they pay for their children’s education purely
through tuition since a positive tax rate implicitly redistributes income away from these
households. Because of their high income and their choice of expensive private schools,
when the tax rate is positive they end up paying more in taxes than what they receive
through the subsidy.
Let us now turn to households with children but whose income is below y+(n,m). For
22In some provinces in Spain the average annual tuition charged by private schools is well below 200 euros
(OCU (2012)), indicating that these schools are almost completely financed by the government.
23Since the subsidy is tied to the expenditure per student in public schools, b = e, we can omit it from
the formal definition of equilibrium. Thus we are left with a two-dimensional policy but one of the variables
is pinned down by the government’s budget constraint. Thus a voting equilibrium will exist under some
regularity conditions.
24This statement can be confirmed by solving the optimal tax choice problem that maximizes the indirect
utility from private school choice under the assumption that the private school subsidy is equal to spending
per student in public schools, b = e.
15
a given public education policy, some of these households send their children to public
schools (those with relatively lower income) while others send their children to private
schools. However, when they form their political preferences, we assume they all internalize
the effect of their vote on education policy and choose a strictly positive tax rate that
maximizes the gains from the public resources devoted to public schools and the subsidy.
The intuition is that these households are relatively poor and therefore optimally choose a
tax that allows them to redistribute income from the wealthier households and in their own
benefit through the school subsidy. For these households, the preferred tax rate is given by
ŝ(y, λ) =






Several points are worth noting. First, the only γm term that appears in the equation
is for m = 0 because only natives are allowed to vote. Second, the preferred tax rate only
varies across voters as a function of income y and the idiosyncratic preference parameter
for education λ. In our calibration, parameter α will be negative. Under this restriction,
individuals with higher income (up to threshold y+(n,m)) or with a higher individual
preference for education will support a higher tax rate. As income rises households demand
higher education levels for their children since here education is a normal good. Their voting
power is used to raise higher tax revenue to be devoted to education, directly in terms of
better funded public schools or through a larger subsidy for private education. Third, the
preferred tax rate does not depend on the number of children. The reason is that voters
with income below threshold y+(n,m) prefer the tax rate that maximizes the utility from
public school and, hence, their out-of-pocket educational expenses do not vary with the
number of children.25
Let us now turn to households without children. As is typically the case in the data, this
group is a majority among voters. Since these voters do not derive utility from education
in our model the majority-vote tax rate will trivially be equal to zero. To address this
issue we assume that the political preferences of childless households are the same as those
with households with one child at the same level of income. The idea is that households
without school-age children care about public education in the real world for a variety of
reasons. For instance, because their unborn children or their grandchildren may attend
public schools in the future.26
25Our analysis has abstracted from other educational expenses such as textbooks.
26Political support for public education for childless households can also be argued on the basis of external
effects associated with a more educated population such as lower crime, positive productivity spillovers,
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We can characterize the equilibrium education policy further. By solving equation (8)











As noted earlier, under the assumption of a negative α, there is a monotone increasing rela-
tionship between a household’s income and its preferred tax rate (provided y ≤ y+(n,m)).









f(y, n, λ, 0)dy +
∫
y+(n,0)
f(y, n, λ, 0)dy
)
dλ. (10)
The first term inside the parenthesis accounts for the households with relatively low income
(public school users) whose preferred tax rate is below ŝ. The second term computes the
number of households whose income is high enough that their preferred tax rate is exactly
zero. This coalition was referred to as the ends against the middle by Epple and Romano
(1996b) because the lowest tax rates are preferred by the households at both extremes of
the income distribution.









f(y, n, λ, 0)dydλ. (11)
The majority-vote equilibrium tax rate must satisfy n0(s
∗) = n̄0(s
∗). That is, the
equilibrium tax rate s∗ exactly balances the number of households who prefer a higher tax
rate with those who prefer a lower tax rate. As discussed in Epple and Romano (1996b), for
some parameter configurations this model may feature multiple equilibria. However, given
a set of parameter values, it is possible to verify the existence and uniqueness of a majority
voting equilibrium numerically. We shall do so for our calibrated model.
4.4 Comparative statics
Before turning to our quantitative analysis we conduct two exercises that will provide the
intuition for the main mechanisms in the model, and discuss a few important implications
of our model.
or a better informed electorate (Coen-Pirani (2011)). Ultimately, an assumption of this type is needed in
practically all political-economy models of education that are calibrated with real-world data.
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Let us begin by considering the effects of an inflow of immigrants characterized by lower
average income than natives. In line with our previous assumptions, these immigrants have
the right to enroll their children in public schools and in subsidized private schools, and
have to pay income taxes just like natives (but do not vote). The equations presented earlier
can be used to show that in our setup this leads to a reduction in spending per student.27
The intuition is similar to the fiscal leakage in Razin et al. (2002). Voters reduce the degree
of tax-based income redistribution because part of the benefits now ‘leak’ to the immigrant
population.28 Naturally, the lower quality of public education lowers the income threshold
for using private schools and triggers a shift from public to private schools.29
Let us now turn to the effects of naturalization of the immigrant population already in
the country. Because of their lower average income, when immigrants gain the right to vote
the median voter will typically move down along the income distribution. Again by virtue
of equation (8), the poorer decisive voter will choose a lower tax rate, which will lead to
lower spending per student.30 Thus if over time immigrants naturalize and gain the right
to vote, the two effects just discussed will add up and result in a relatively large reduction
in public education spending per student.
27Clearly, when these immigrants join the economy average household income falls. As a result, given the
tax rate, public spending in education per child falls because of a tax-base effect. As seen in equation (8),
because α is negative, the lower average income will lead to a higher preferred tax rate as the decisive voter
partially offsets the reduction in public spending by raising the tax rate. Nonetheless it can be shown that
the public spending per student falls. It is also worth noting that, even though immigrants cannot vote, the
identity of the median voter is affected by immigration. The reduction in average income lowers threshold
y+ and increases the number of voters who prefer a tax rate below any given value, as seen in equation (10),
which alters the identity of the median voter.
28In their paper the tax rate finances a redistributive transfer and immigrants can vote. Even though immi-
grants support higher redistribution, the median voter chooses to reduce the degree of income redistribution
because of the leakage.
29An interesting extension of our setup would be to allow for public schools that differ in terms of perceived
quality. This could happen even if all public schools refer the same financing per student but, for instance,
parental involvement is also an input into the education production function and parents sort across schools
on the basis of this trait. We hypothesize that, in this new environment, immigrant children would probably
be disproportionately found in the low-quality public schools given the inexperience of their parents in
identify the most attractive schools. As a result, immigration would trigger a shift from the worse public
schools toward private schools.
30Even though the tax rate moves in the opposite direction than in the previous analysis of the effects of
immigration without naturalization, it is also the case that the quality of public education (public spending
per student) is reduced. Mechanically, the reason why the poorer median voter prefers a lower tax rate is
because of the negative value of α. Intuitively, because of her lower income, the decisive voter cannot afford
the prior level of taxes and, thus, chooses to lower the tax rate. This result depends, to some extent, on the
tax instruments that are considered in the Epple and Romano economy. If lump-sum taxes were allowed,
the median voter would be able to extract more from the wealthier households. One should keep in mind
also that in our setup tax revenue can only be used to finance education, and cannot be directly translated
into private consumption. Using data for Swedish municipalities Vernby (2013) found that enfranchising
non-citizens led to higher social spending.
18
An important implicit assumption of our model is that natives are unable to shield
themselves from immigrants by moving to locations with a limited immigrant population.
Otherwise, their response to immigration might not require switching to tuition-based pri-
vate schools. The data suggest that this is not the case in Spain. The scatter plot in
Figure 2 compares the 2000-2008 change in the native population against the change in
the foreign-born population across Spanish provinces. The data show a clear positive rela-
tionship, indicating that the immigrant-receiving provinces also experienced an increase in
the native population. Intuitively, regions with booming economies attracted both immi-
grants and natives and experienced an increase in the competition for schools among the
population in those regions.
Finally, it is also important to discuss the role played by the subsidy to private schools,
one of the novel features of our framework. Intuitively, the existence of subsidized private
schools leads to a lower equilibrium level of enrollment in public schools given that private
schools are now affordable to a large swath of the population. What is less obvious is
how the availability of the subsidy mediates the effects of immigration on the schooling
system. On the one hand the presence of inexpensive private schools makes it easier for
native households to switch to private schools in response to immigration. But because the
subsidy is financed through the same tax that funds public schools, political support for the
subsidy is directly connected to support for a relatively high quality of public education,
which in turn, reduces the incentives to switch to private schools. Thus the presence of
the subsidy may increase or decrease native flight, depending on which of the two opposite




The model is calibrated to Spain in year 2008. The reason we pick this year is that it
marks the end of the immigration wave and the beginning of the Great Recession and
the ensuing economic distress. Our baseline model assumes that private schools receive a
subsidy per student equal to the spending per student in public schools. It also assumes
that educating one immigrant child (of any group) has the same cost as educating a native
child. This is a conservative choice that will lead to more muted effects of immigration on
the quality of public education. We also provide several other calibrations where we vary
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these assumptions.
To calibrate the model we need to specify the values of the time-invariant parameters and
the joint density function f t(y, n,m, λ), which varies across years. We follow the calibration
strategy proposed by Coen-Pirani (2011). Specifically, to calibrate the f t(y, n, λ,m) we
assume that the taste parameter λ is independent of (y, n,m) in the population. The
distribution of λ is taken to be lognormal with constant parameters (µλ, σλ). The parameter
µλ is set at −σ2λ/2 so as to deliver a mean value for λ equal one. The joint distribution of
(y, n,m) in year t can be decomposed as:
gt(y|n,m)ht(n,m) (12)
where ht(n,m) is the joint probability of (n,m). The conditional density function gt(y|n,m)
is assumed to be lognormal with parameters µty(n,m) and σ
t
y(n,m). The latter are esti-
mated for year 2008 by matching the conditional mean E[y|n,m] and variance V [y|n,m] of
household income in the data for that same year.
Immigration status (m) takes five possible values according to whether the household
head is native (m = 0) or foreign-born (m = 1, 2, 3, 4). Specifically, it takes the value of
1 for immigrants from European countries, 2 for those from Africa, 3 for America (North,
Central or South), and 4 for Asia and Oceania. The number of children in a household
(n) is assumed to take four possible values: 0, 1, 2, and 3+, where 3+ equals the average
number of children in households with at least 3 children in the data. Distribution ht(n,m)
is estimated non-parametrically using the frequency count of each cell (n,m) in the data.
The cost of education for a native household p0 is normalized to one without loss of
generality. The relative cost of education for an immigrant child is set conservatively to be
equal to that of natives, namely p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = 1, in the benchmark case. However,
we will also consider scenarios where the cost of education for immigrants is higher than
that for natives since it is often the case that remedial classes or extra help in the form
of language instruction is provided to recently arrived immigrant children. For example,
Coen-Pirani (2011) sets the cost of education for immigrant children in California to be
four percent above that for native children.
We calibrate the seven parameters (α, γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4, σλ) to match seven moments in
the data. The first five moments are the number of native (m = 0) and immigrant children
(m = 1, 2, 3, 4) enrolled in public schools in year 2008. Note that matching these moments
implies that the model will also exactly match the enrollment of each group in private schools
as well as the share of each group that attends public schools. These are important moments
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since the data shows a large disparity in the share of children in each group attending public
school, ranging from 65 percent (natives) to 90 percent (African immigrants), as documented
in Table 3 (column 1, bottom panel).31 The sixth targeted moment is the share of aggregate
household income spent by the government to fund compulsory education, which includes
both the direct funding of public schools as well as the subsidy to private schools. This
value is directly related to the tax rate determined endogenously in the model and we refer
to it as the implicit (education) tax rate. The seventh moment is the ratio between the
average incomes of households with children in public and private schools in 2008.
While the seven-equation system is highly non-linear, let us try to provide some intuition
on which are the key parameters involved in attaining this calibration targets. For the
enrollment in public school for each group, the key parameter is γm, the group-specific
parameter governing the taste for education relative to consumption. Higher values of γm
are associated with a higher willingness to spend on education and thus lower public school
attendance for children belonging to group m.32 Parameter σλ determines the degree of
income mixing in private schools, with higher levels of σλ associated with a higher ratio
of average household income in public relative to private schools, namely, a lower degree
of income segregation in schools. Finally, parameter α is crucial to determine the share of
aggregate income devoted to education by the government, that is, the implicit tax rate
because it determines the tax elasticity of the demand for education services.
5.2 Calibration results
Let us begin by presenting the 7 target data moments. These are reported in Table 3,
column 1 (top panel).33 The implicit education tax rate in the data is 5.93 percent. We
calculate this by computing the overall public spending in compulsory education (including
the subsidy to private schools) in year 2008 and dividing by household income in that same
year. This is a reasonably good approximation to the tax rate in our model, which is used
exclusively to finance education. The next five moments are the number of public school
students (per 100 households) that belong to each group m = 0, 1, ..., 4. Obviously, these
31The number of students in public schools for each group m is estimated using the total number of
children and the actual share of public school students for each group m. See Section A.3 for the detail.
32We will refer to parameter γm as the average preference for education for group m. It is worth noting
though that many subsidized (concerted) private schools originated as Catholic schools, which may affect a
group’s average preference for education. Parameter γm may also capture cross-group differences in average
education, if parental education matters for children’s education through channels other than family income
and household size.
33The public school students per 100 households (24.88) is not a targeted moment. We target the analogous
moments for natives and the four immigrant groups, which can be added to obtain the overall 24.88.
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figures are a function both of the absolute size of each group as well as of the group’s
preference for public schools.34 Finally, we also target the relative income of households
that use public school relative to those that use private school, which is 0.73. The second
column in the table reports the same 7 moments in our calibrated model, which we are able
to match with a high degree of accuracy.
We next comment on the specific values of the parameters that result from our moment
matching exercise. Table 2 reports the calibration parameters. The first column presents
the calibrated values in our main specification, where private schools receive a subsidy equal
to the spending per student in public schools and we assume that the cost of educating im-
migrant children is the same as that of educating native children. The calibrated value of the
parameter α is −0.87, which is negative (as anticipated) and in line with existing empirical
estimates.35 The table also reports the calibrated parameters that govern the distribution
of household preference shocks for education (relative to consumption), which we denoted
by λ. More importantly, the table also reports the values for the coefficients that govern
the group-specific taste for education, γm. The lower values for these parameters relative
to γ0 imply that immigrant households have a smaller preference parameter for education
(relative to consumption) than native households. This is an implication of the fact that
immigrant households are less likely to have children in private school conditional on income
and family size. The calibration procedure then accounts for the observed enrollment of
immigrant children in public school by selecting a value for γm for m = 1, 2, 3, 4 smaller than
the corresponding one for γ0. For native households γ0 = 0.52. Among immigrant groups
the highest value is for Asians, with γ4 = 0.39 and the lowest is for Africans (γ2 = 0.12).
Column 2 in the Table reports the parameter vector that matches the seven target
moments when we assume that the cost of educating one immigrant child is 10 percent
higher than the cost of educating one native child.36 Generally, the values of the parameters
are very similar to those presented in the first column. However, the values for the group-
specific taste for education, γm, are slightly higher for immigrants (and lower for natives)
than in column 1. This is intuitive since stronger preference for education is needed to offset
34The bottom panel in the table reports the share of the students in each group that attend public schools.
These shares are perfectly matched when the number of public school students for each group is matched.
35The price-elasticity (in absolute value) implied by this value of α is 0.53, only slightly higher than the
range (0.25, 0.50) reported by Bergstrom et al. (1982) in their survey of the literature, and smaller than the
value implied by Fernandez and Rogerson (1998)’s calibration for California.
36In this case the number of education units received by immigrant children, which is what enters the
utility function of the household, will differ from education spending per student. This was not the case
for our main specification (column 1) because there we assumed an equal education cost for natives and
immigrants (and normalized that cost to be one).
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the higher cost but still attain the levels of school attendance targeted in the calibration.
We now turn to evaluate the performance of our calibrated model. The credibility of the
counterfactual analysis in the next section crucially depends on the ability of the model to
match the target moments as well as some other relevant moments that have not been used
as calibration targets. As noted already, we are able to perfectly solve for the 7-equation
system, namely, we find values for the 7 parameters that allow us to match with high
accuracy the 7 target moments, as can be seen in columns 1 and 2 in Table 3. We now
propose a more relevant validation exercise. We compute the equilibrium maintaining the
values for the 7 key parameters but replacing the 2008 data for the distributions of income
(conditional on number of children and group) and of the number of children and group for
the corresponding values in year 2000, namely, g2000(y|n,m), h2000(n,m). We then compare
the resulting equilibrium predictions to data.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 report the predictions of the model for year 2000 and the
actual data for that same year. The model correctly predicts a higher number of native
students (per 100 households) enrolled in public schools in year 2000 (26.59) than in 2008
(19.67). The model also reproduces the lower numbers of immigrant children enrolled in
public schools in year 2000, relative to 2008. For instance, the data show a reduction from
1.55 immigrant children of European origin (per 100 households) in column 1 to 0.28 in
column 3. According to the model, the corresponding figures are 1.55 and 0.31 (column 4).
Apparently, the model predictions do not fare as well regarding the share of native
students enrolled in public schools. The data shows a slightly higher share in year 2000
(65.97%) than in year 2008 (64.67%). In contrast, according to the model the share of
native students in public school in year 2000 should have been 4 percentage-points lower
than in year 2008 (column 4), which is a bit puzzling.
In terms of data fed into the model, columns 2 and 4 differ both in demographics and
in terms of the income distribution. However, the key difference lies in the demographic
changes between the two years. But, perhaps surprisingly, the key change is unrelated to
immigration. Rather, it has to do with the large reduction in the size of native households.
While the average number of children per household was 0.45 in year 2000, the corresponding
figure was 22 percent lower (at 0.35) in year 2008.37 The large drop in the number of
native school-age children between 2000 and 2008 overshadowed the increase in immigrant
children during the same period. To prove this point, column 5 presents the results of a
37This sharp drop in household size was simply a reflection of the rapid reduction in the fertility rates
among Spanish women during the previous decade, falling from 1.36 children per woman in 1990 to 1.16 in
1998 (World Development Indicators).
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simulation where we keep the size and characteristics of the immigrant population at 2008
levels, along with the number of native households and the income distributions of natives
and immigrants. That is to say, the only difference between columns 5 and 2 lies in the
household size distribution for the native population. Because of the much higher number
of school-age children in year 2000 (column 5), spending per student in public schools was
much lower than in 2008 and, as a result, a much lower share of native households (of about
3.5 percentage points) chose to send their children to public schools.
While this reveals a weakness of our model, we note that our main interest is not to
predict the effects of changes in the native population. What we are mainly concerned with
is the response to changes in the immigrant population. Along this dimension, the model
performs fairly well. In the data (columns 1 and 3) we observe lower public shares in year
2000, relative to 2008, for the 4 immigrant groups. Comparison of columns 2 and 4 shows
that the model correctly predicts the direction of these changes.
The table also reports the public education spending per student and a measure of the
quality of public education, namely, the number of education units received by students in
public schools. For our main model, these two variables exactly coincide because the cost of
educating immigrant children is taken to be the same as that of educating native children
(and normalized to one). Importantly, our calibrated model predicts accurately the lower
spending per student in public schools in year 2000 (2,276 euros compared to 2,337 euros in
the data) compared to 2008 (4,582 euros both in data and model).38 Overall these figures
provide validation of the use of our model for quantitative analysis and, specifically, regard-
ing its ability to produce reasonable predictions in response to changes in the immigrant
population.
6 Main Results
We are now ready to tackle the main goal of the paper: the evaluation of the effects of
the 2000-2008 immigration wave on the schooling system in the short, medium, and long
runs. We shall focus on the effects on the school choices of the native population and on
the consequences for the funding and quality of public education.
Immigration is a multi-faceted phenomenon and its effects are likely to be staggered over
time. To clarify ideas we find it helpful to proceed in three stages, which we will later map
38Education expenditure per student was doubled over 8 years. This is a reflection of the increase of total
public education spending for pre-university levels from 17 billion euros in 2000 to 32 billion euros in 2008
(National Education Indicators, 2012).
24
into short, medium and long-run effects of immigration. These three stages correspond to
(1) the effects of immigration, focusing on the implications for educational spending when
the children of immigrants enter the schooling system, (2) the effects of naturalization, which
grants immigrants the right to vote, and (3) the effects of assimilation along all relevant
dimensions.
6.1 The Effects of Immigration
In order to isolate the short-run effects of the 2000-2008 immigration wave we conduct the
following simulation exercise. Starting from our baseline scenario (income and demographics
as in year 2008), we solve for the equilibrium in a scenario where the income distribution
is as in 2008 (g2008) but where the size and composition of the immigrant population are
as in year 2000 (h2000). The comparison between the two scenarios identifies the effects of
the arrival of immigrants (and their children), holding the income distribution of natives
constant. The effects of immigration here will operate through the increase in the overall
number of school-age children in the economy, and its effects on the key trade-off pondered
by the median voter.
Table 4 presents our findings. The first column reports the actual data for year 2008 for
the implicit tax rate, public school enrollment for each of the 5 groups, and public spending
in education per student. Column 2 reports the same outcomes for the scenario where
the foreign-born population in Spain equals, in size and origin composition, that of year
2000. As we discussed earlier, the implicit tax rate is lower in the counterfactual where
the immigrant population is as in year 2000, but the reduction turns out to be small (5.90
versus 5.93 percent).
Let us now turn to the size of public education. In the counterfactual (without the
immigration wave) the total enrollment in public schools is lower than in the benchmark.
In other words, immigration has led to a sizable increase in the size of public education.
Specifically, immigration has raised the number of public school students from 23.62 to
24.88 per 100 households. Given the large increase in the number of households due to
immigration, overall public enrollment has increased by 0.94 million students.39 At the
same time there has been a significant native flight toward private schools: immigration
has led to a 0.8 percentage-point reduction in the share of native students in public schools,
amounting to 0.38 million students. Turning now to the effects of immigration on the quality
39In comparison, between the same period the number of students with foreign nationality in Spain
increased by about 0.5 million.
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of public education, measured by public spending per student, we find that if immigration
had remained as in year 2000 spending per student would have been 4,727 euros, or 3.2
percent higher than in the benchmark.
Are these magnitudes large or small? To answer this question it is useful to compare our
findings to those reported by Coen-Pirani (2011) in his analysis for California.40 He reports
that if the immigrant population had remained as in 1970, the share of native children
enrolled in public schools in 1980 would have been 0.17 percentage points higher, and
spending per student in public schools would have been 3 percent higher.41 These figures
are similar to our findings for Spain, particularly in regards to the change in public spending
per student (3.17 percent reduction). The size of the native flight is substantially larger in
our results (0.76 versus 0.17 percentage points), partly due to the larger immigration flow
in Spain and partly because of the subsidy to private schools, as we discuss further below.
Let us now examine a few alternative counterfactual scenarios. In column 3 we consider
the scenario where the whole immigrant population is removed, as opposed to going back
to the year-2000 immigrant population. Not surprisingly, the results are magnified, with
a 4.38 percent reduction in spending per student and a reduction in the share of natives
attending public schools of 1.04 percentage points. The remaining columns in Table 4
present sensitivity analysis along two different dimensions. In column 4 we report the
results when we allow for a higher cost of educating immigrant children (10 percent). In
this case the share of native children in public schools would have been a bit higher in the
absence of immigration (66.08 versus 65.71 percent) and the quality of public education
slightly lower than in the previous column.
The rest of the Table is devoted to analyzing the role of the subsidy to private education
and how it mediates the effects of immigration. Naturally, the subsidy makes private schools
affordable to a large swath of the population and, hence, greatly increases the share of
students that attend private schools. It is less obvious how the presence of the subsidy
affects the effects of immigration on native flight or on the quality of public education. To
evaluate quantitatively the role of the subsidy, we simulate the model exogenously setting
40He studies an immigration episode that lasted 3 decades, between 1970 and 2000. The most relevant
comparison to our analysis is when we focus on his findings for the 1970-1980 period. During that period
the share of immigrant children enrolled in Californian schools increased by about 7.5 percentage points.
This is only a bit smaller than the 10 percentage-point increase in the immigrant share in schools (and in
the working-age population) in Spain.
41Concerning his full period of analysis, Coen-Pirani (2011) reports that if immigration had remained
at the 1970 level the share of native children enrolled in public schools in year 2000 in California would
have been 1.12 percentage points higher and spending per student in public schools 24 percent higher than
otherwise.
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the level of the subsidy at zero (as in Coen-Pirani (2011)). Column 5 in Table 4 presents the
results. This column can be compared to column 1 (Data). As expected, the share of native
children in public schools would have been much higher without the subsidy (85 versus 65
percent), which accounts for the large differences in school choices between Spain and other
countries, such as the United States, where the share of students in private schools is much
lower than in Spain. In terms of public spending per student, the differences between
columns 1 and 5 are small. Without the subsidy public spending per student would have
been 1.15 percent higher. The reason is that households in the middle range of the income
distribution would have switched from private to public schools. Since those households
have relatively high income, they prefer higher quality of public education. Interestingly,
this higher expenditure could be achieved with a lower tax rate because all tax revenues
would now be used exclusively to finance public schools.
But how are the effects of immigration on public education affected by the availability of
the subsidy? The comparison between column 5 (immigrants as in year 2008) and column
6 (immigrants as in year 2000) identifies these effects.42 As it turns out the effects of
immigration are very similar in the scenarios with and without the subsidy. In the absence
of the 2000-2008 immigration wave, public spending per student would have been about 3
percent higher, similarly to what we found in the model with the subsidy. Turning now
to the size of the native flight toward private schools, we find that in the absence of the
subsidy there would have been a significantly larger native flight: the native share in public
schools would have fallen by 0.56 percentage points (from 85.61 to 85.05), compared to the
0.76 percentage-point reduction in the model with the subsidy.
6.2 The Effects of Naturalization
We now focus on the effects of granting the right to vote to the immigrant population
residing in Spain in year 2008. At this point the economy does not experience any changes
in its demographic composition or in income. It is purely an exercise in franchise extension,
keeping the characteristics of the immigrant population unchanged.43
From our political-economy perspective the fundamental implication is the resulting
42This is akin as comparing columns 1 and 2 for the model with the subsidy.
43In Spain most foreign citizens are allowed to apply for citizenship after 5 to 10 years of legal residence
in Spain. In general foreign nationals can apply for Spanish citizenship after 10 years of legal residence.
However, several groups can apply earlier. For instance, refugees can apply just after 5 years of residence.
Citizens of Latin America, Portugal, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and those with sephardic origins can
obtain Spanish nationality after two years. Foreign-born individuals married to Spanish citizens or children
of Spanish citizens can apply after only one year of legal residence (Spanish Ministry of Justice).
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change in the number and distribution of voters. To the extent that average household
income is lower for immigrant households than for native ones, naturalization will lead to
a downward shift of the median voter along the income distribution.44 For short we refer
to this exercise as the effect of naturalization.
Table 5 reports the results. Again, column 1 reports the actual values of the moments
for year 2008. Column 2 reports the values for the counterfactual scenario where immigrants
have been enfranchised according to our main specification, that is, when private schools
are subsidized and the cost of education is the same for native and immigrant children.
We find a significantly lower implicit tax rate, at 5.50 percent, as opposed to 5.93 in the
data. This leads to a large reduction in the quality of public education, with spending per
student in public schools falling by 7.68 percent. Naturally, we find a sizable reduction in
the probability of using public schools for the native population, from 64.67 to 62.54 percent
(2.13 percentage points). In comparison to the (short-run) effects of immigration discussed
earlier, these figures indicate that the reduction in quality and the size of the native flight
will be about twice as large when naturalization takes place.
Columns 3 and 4 provide robustness checks. In column 3 we assume that the cost
of educating immigrants is 10 percent higher than the corresponding cost for natives. The
results are largely unchanged. Again the native flight to private schools is about 2 percentage
points and the quality of public education falls by about 7 percent following naturalization.
Likewise the results in column 4 show that the effects of naturalization are similar in the
variations of the model with and without the subsidy.45
In conclusion, our analysis predicts that naturalization will have larger effects on the
schooling system than the direct effect of immigration. The next section asks whether
assimilation of the immigrant population has the potential to alter these predictions.
6.3 The Effects of Assimilation
Traditionally, economists have focused on economic assimilation, that is, the rate of conver-
gence of immigrant wages toward the wages of comparable natives. However, in the context
44Even when immigrants are not enfranchised, it is possible that they influence the domestic politics of
the host country. This can be the case if politicians/voters are foresighted and try to court the sympathies
of the soon-to-be franchised immigrant population (Ortega (2005), Ortega (2010)).
45Naturally, in this case the share of students in public schools would have been much larger. Compared
to column 5 in Table 4 (where immigrants cannot vote) reveals that the share of native students in public
schools would have fallen by 1.56 percentage points and public spending per student would have fallen by 7.2
percent. As discussed above, in the economy with the subsidy these figures would have been 2.13 percentage
points and 7.7 percent, respectively. Thus, again, taking into account the presence of the subsidy does not
alter much our predictions.
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of our model there are other dimensions of assimilation that need to be taken into account:
convergence in income, in family size, and in preferences toward education. We analyze the
effects of the full assimilation of naturalized immigrants along each of these dimensions,
which we refer to as the effect of assimilation.
In order to examine the effects of each dimension of assimilation we conduct a number of
counterfactuals. Separately assessing each dimension is important because the policies that
target assimilation along each dimension may differ widely.46 In all cases our benchmark
is the naturalization equilibrium where the immigrant population has naturalized but not
assimilated, that is, its income distribution, family size, and preference parameters are as
in the calibration of the model discussed earlier.
Table 6 presents the results. The first column reports again the results of the natural-
ization experiment (column 2 in the previous table). In this scenario 62.54% of the children
of native households attended public schools and the average education spending by the
public sector was 4,230 euros per student.
Column 2 reports the results of the naturalization experiment but now we endow the
immigrant population with the same income distribution as the native population, leaving
all other dimensions as dictated by the data. It is typically the case that immigrants
upgrade their occupation with time in the host country, which is accompanied by gains in
earnings, and has been corroborated for Spain by Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2007).
Naturally, in reality income assimilation may not be complete since many low-education
immigrants are unlikely to obtain more education, which may impose a ceiling on their
earnings. Thus the values in columns 1 and 2 provide a range of outcomes, varying from
no income assimilation (column 1) to full income assimilation (column 2). The figures
show that income assimilation has noticeable but small effects. Even when the income
distribution of immigrants is the same as natives, the share of natives in public schools
goes up only by about half a percentage point to 62.99%, and average spending per student
increases by 1.8% relative to the value in column 1. Intuitively, average income rises for the
immigrant population, which reduces fiscal leakage, slightly increases public spending per
student, and attenuates the native flight.
Column 3 assumes that immigrants fully assimilate in terms of demographics, that is,
we assign to them the native distribution for family size. Thus the average number of
children for immigrant families is now lower than in the data. The resulting changes are
46For instance, income assimilation entails providing further education or re-training programs, whereas
convergence in preferences for education may have more to do with providing information on the returns to
education and ensuring equality of opportunity in the labor market.
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larger in magnitude than those implied by income assimilation. Specifically, the share of
natives in public schools goes up to 63.52%, one full percentage point higher than in the
naturalization scenario (column 1). Likewise average educational spending increases by 4%
to 4,398 euros. The intuition is also straightforward. While average income for immigrants
is the same as in column 1, their average number of school-age children is now lower. So
their net contribution to the public coffers is significantly higher, leading to higher public
spending per student.
Now we turn to preference assimilation (column 4). In this case we endow immigrants
with the preference parameter for education of the native group, leaving the income and
family size distributions as in the data. We now find the largest effects. The share of native
students in public schools now becomes 64.67%, more than 2 percentage points higher than
in column 1, and public spending per student is now 8.3% higher than in the naturalization
scenario. Intuitively, now immigrants have a higher preference for education and, since they
have the right to vote, the new median voter is more in favor of financing education, leading
to a higher tax rate and better quality for public schools.
What if immigrants fully assimilated along all dimensions (income, demographics and
preferences) and became indistinguishable from natives? Column 5 reports our findings. As
expected, in this case the share of native students in public schools is the highest, at 65.71%,
more than 3 percentage points higher than in column 1. Likewise, public spending per stu-
dent is now 4,783 euros, 13 percent higher than in the naturalization (without assimilation)
scenario. It is also worth noting that these results exactly coincide with those of column 3 in
Table 4, the scenario depicting the equilibrium outcomes in the absence of any immigrants.
In other words, the model is linearly homogeneous: cloning the native population leaves the
tax rate, school choices, and the quality of public education unaffected.
Interestingly, our analysis of assimilation yields results that differ from those those
reported by Coen-Pirani (2011) for California. He found that demographic assimilation was
the most important driver of the effects of immigration in California. In contrast, the key
dimension of assimilation is on the preference for education. Since our calibration revealed
important differences in this parameter across immigrant groups, this finding underscores
the importance of allowing for preference heterogeneity among the immigrant population.
6.4 Long-Run Scenarios
We find it useful to collect the key values from the earlier tables to produce a summary
table of the long-run effects of immigration, after taking into account naturalization and
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a range of assimilation outcomes. We focus on three key outcomes: public spending per
student, overall enrollment in public schools, and the share of natives in public schools.
Respectively, these variables summarize the quality of public education, its size, and the
choices of the native population in each scenario.
Table 7 presents the results. The top panel of the Table simply collects the relevant
values from the previous tables. The first row is the pre-immigration scenario, corresponding
to the counterfactual scenario where immigration is assumed to be as in year 2000 (but with
the 2008 income distribution). The second row (in italics) corresponds to our benchmark,
which includes the 2000-2008 immigrants but these individuals are not allowed to vote. The
third row depicts the scenario where the 2008 immigrant population has gained citizenship.
Finally, the fourth row assumes that the naturalized population has fully assimilated.47
The middle panel presents a decomposition of the effects of immigration into the “pure”
effect of immigration, the effect of naturalization, and the effect of (full) assimilation. The
effect of immigration is computed as the difference between the benchmark outcomes (based
on the immigrant population in 2008) and the counterfactual scenario where immigration
is assumed to be as in year 2000. Our results imply a 3.2 percent drop in public spending
per student.48 Naturally, this leads to a reduction in the share of native households using
public schools (by 0.8 percentage points). Despite this native flight, overall enrollment in
public schools grows by 15.1% relative to the benchmark value due to the large inflow of
immigrant children into the public system.
Next, we turn to the marginal effect of naturalization, defined as the difference in out-
comes between the naturalization scenario and the benchmark. In both scenarios, the
immigrant population is exactly identical in both size and composition, and the only differ-
ence is that in the naturalization scenario immigrants participate in the electoral process.
The table shows that naturalization entails a large reduction in public spending per stu-
dent (by 7.7 percent of the benchmark value). Naturally, this leads to a strong response
by the native population that reduces its share in public schools by 2.1 percentage points.
This time overall enrollment in public schools falls, both because of the flight of natives
and immigrants with relatively high incomes (and preference for education) toward private
alternatives.
We now turn to the estimation of the marginal effect of assimilation, computed as
47It is worth recalling that the full assimilation scenario has the same public spending per student and
school choices as the scenario with no immigration whatsoever (column 3 in Table 4).
48As explained in the footnote to the table, all changes in spending are reported relative to the benchmark
value. This way the figures in the bottom panel can be obtained by simply adding the corresponding values
in the middle panel.
31
the difference in outcomes between the full assimilation scenario and the naturalization
scenario. According to our analysis, full assimilation entails a 12.1% increase in public
spending per student, relative to the corresponding value in the naturalization scenario.49
Not surprisingly, this large marginal increase in the quality of schooling triggers a large
increase in the share of natives choosing public schools (by 3.2 percentage points), and
increases overall enrollment in the public system by 4.9%.
The bottom panel of the table builds on the marginal effects of immigration, natural-
ization and assimilation to provide a range of values for the combined long-run effect, as a
function of the degree of assimilation. Assimilation is better viewed as a long-run outcome
that can take more than a decade to materialize and may even not be fully attained within
a generation. In fact assimilation is not just a function of the length of stay in the host
country. Rates of assimilation may be affected by public policies and often differ substan-
tially across immigrant groups in the same country of origin, partly as a function of the
cultural distance between the countries of origin and destination.50
The first row in the bottom panel provides our prediction under the pessimistic assump-
tion of no assimilation. This prediction is computed by adding the effects of immigration and
naturalization in the middle panel.51 Under these conditions public spending per student
would end up substantially lower than in the immigration-as-in-2000 scenario (by about
10 percent of the benchmark value) and, accordingly, native enrollment in public schools
would decrease by almost 3 percentage points. Nevertheless the overall enrollment in public
schools would increase by about 12 percent due to the inflow of immigrant children.
The second row of the panel reports the combined long-run effects under the optimistic
scenario with full assimilation, computed by adding up the effects of immigration, natu-
ralization, and (full) assimilation.52 In this case public spending per student would end
49This figure is computed as the difference between 4,783 and 4,230 Euros, divided by the benchmark
value (4,582 Euros).
50De la Rica et al. (2015) provide an extensive review of the literature on economic assimilation. They
conclude that native-immigrant gaps in labor market outcomes are very persistent and report substantial
heterogeneity across origin and destination countries. Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2007) study occu-
pational upgrading among immigrants in Spain. They find evidence of substantial upgrading for Eastern
Europeans and Latin Americans, but no progress for African immigrants. Algan et al. (2010) compare
assimilation outcomes in the UK, France and Germany. They find that the UK is features the largest
native-immigrant gaps. However, it is also the country showing a larger improvement in the outcomes of
second-generation immigrants.
51Equivalently, the no-assimilation combined effect can be computed as the difference between the out-
comes in the naturalization scenario and in the scenario that assumes that the immigrant population remains
as in year 2000.
52Alternatively, it is the difference between the assimilation scenario and the scenario where the immigrant
population remains as in year 2000.
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up slightly above the value in the absence of the immigration wave (by about 1 percent),
which pulls some natives into public schools (by 0.3 percentage points). As a result, overall
enrollment in public schools grows strongly (by close to 17 percent).
In conclusion, the long-run effect of the immigration wave on the quality of public edu-
cation will range between a substantial negative effect and a small positive one, depending
on the degree of assimilation achieved by the immigrant population. Accordingly, this will
determine whether native flight toward private school alternatives takes place or not. Either
way, what seems sure is that overall enrollment in public schools will increase strongly, with
enrollment growth being increasing in the degree of assimilation of the immigrant popula-
tion. Naturally, the key question is how much assimilation is likely to take place. In light
of international evidence (De la Rica et al. (2015)), most likely assimilation will be far from
complete. To what extent it is attained is an empirical question, depending importantly
on the composition of the immigrant population and the the policies adopted to facilitate
assimilation.
7 Alternative Immigration Policies
One of the new features of our model is that we have allowed for multiple immigrant
groups, differing in size, preferences, and composition (in terms of income and family size).
This feature of the model makes it uniquely suited to evaluate the effects of alternative
immigration policies on the education system of the receiving country, in the spirit of the
theoretical exercise in Dottori et al. (2013).
Toward this goal we simulate a series of scenarios where we fix the level of immigration
but vary its composition in terms of region of origin. The motivation is that immigration
policies in many countries favor one group of immigrants over another, often stemming from
colonial links, cultural affinity, or geopolitical proximity.53
Specifically, we consider four scenarios. Across all of these we keep constant the overall
number of immigrants that arrived in Spain between 2000 and 2008 at its observed value,
but assume that all these immigrants belong to a single region of origin. For example, in the
first scenario all immigrants are assumed to originate from Europe and are characterized
by the preferences for education and the distributions for income and family size described
53For instance, EU citizens enjoy free labor mobility within the Union, Latin American immigrants have
a preferential treatment in Spain’s immigration laws in terms of visa waivers and a fast track to citizenship
(Bertoli et al. (2011), Bertoli et al. (2013)). Likewise the US favors the immigration of Cubans, and France,
the UK, the Netherlands, and other former colonial powers grant similar rights to immigrants from countries
that used to be under their influence.
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earlier in the calibration section. Analogously, in the other scenarios we assume that all
immigrants originated, in turn, from Africa, America and Asia.54
Table 8 presents our results. The first two columns report short-run effects and columns
3 and 4 report medium-to-long-run effects.55 We focus on two key outcomes of interest:
the share of children of native households that attend public schools, which can be used to
quantify the size of the native flight, and the quality of public schools, measured by public
spending per student. Glancing at columns 1 and 2 reveals that if all immigrants had
originated from Europe, the share of native households using public schools and the quality
of public education would have been the highest (65.16% and 4,676 Euros), significantly
better than in the short-run benchmark. In contrast, in the short run, these outcomes would
have been the worst with an immigration policy that admitted only African immigrants,
even though the differences are not dramatic (64.24% and 4,504 Euros).
Interestingly, a different picture arises from the medium-run results (columns 3 and 4).
In this case the best outcomes are obtained in the scenario where all immigrants originate
from Asia. In this case public spending per student and the share of native households using
public schools would be 4,384 Euros and 63.52%, respectively, which also improves upon the
medium-run benchmark (naturalization but no assimilation). Again, the worst outcomes
are obtained in the scenario of all-African immigration (61.67% and 4,091 Euros). The
differences in outcomes between the two policies (all Asian versus all African immigrants)
are now larger, almost a 2-percentage point difference in the share of native households
using public schools and a 7% difference in public spending per student.
What accounts for these differences? Table 9 summarizes the characteristics of each of
the groups of immigrants along the three relevant dimensions: average number of school-age
children, household income, and preference for education. On average, household income for
immigrant households is about 8 percent lower than for native households, with relatively
small differences across immigrant groups. As a result, income differences across origin
groups are not terribly important. Instead, what drives the finding that a policy admitting
only European immigrants would deliver the best short-run outcomes is the fact that this
group displays the lowest family size. Namely, the average number of school-age children
54Implicitly, we are assuming that the host country can increase the level of immigration from a particular
origin region without affecting the pattern of selection. This assumption is plausible in our particular
application because our regions are large (continents) and the overall level of immigration is relatively small.
55Recall that in our short-run scenarios we assume that immigrants do not vote and have the characteristics
observed in the data. In our medium-run scenario immigrants naturalize and participate in elections, but
their characteristics are kept fixed at the levels we observe in the data in year 2008. In the event that
immigrants’ characteristics remain fixed at these levels, the medium-run results can be interpreted as long-
run results in the absence of further assimilation.
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for European immigrants is 0.37, compared to 0.46 for the overall immigrant population.
From a long-run perspective, the role of demographics is dwarfed by the differences
in preferences for education across immigrant groups. As shown in the Table (column
3), the calibrated education preference parameter, γm, is much lower than for natives.
Interestingly, Asian immigrants display the highest value for this parameter (0.39 versus
0.16-0.21 for the other immigrant groups). Once immigrants are enfranchised this makes
a material difference. The high preference for education of Asian immigrants leads to a
more pro-education median voter than in the benchmark scenario with naturalization.56 It
is interesting to dig a bit deeper in the reasons for the less positive outcomes in the scenario
with all-African immigration. As shown in Table 9, average household size is similar for
Africans and Asians in Spain. In contrast the preference parameter for education is almost
twice as large for Asian immigrants. This is an important insight that should be useful to
policymakers in designing policies that help this group of immigrants assimilate. Our results
suggests two policies that may be particularly helpful to promote the assimilation of African
immigrants in Spain: dissemination of information regarding the returns to education and
policies aimed at reducing labor-market discrimination for this group.57
Summing up, our analysis in this section has made full use of an important novel feature
of our framework: allowing for multiple immigrant groups. We have learned that the
immigration policy that Spain had in place during the period 2000-2008, favoring Latin
American and intra-EU immigrants, had a significant effect on our predictions. It may
have increased short-run outcomes by tilting inflows in favor of groups with fewer school-
age children (like European immigrants). However, these groups may not assimilate as
rapidly, or to the same extent, in terms of their preferences for education as some other
groups of immigrants. As a result, the policy may have maximized short-term outcomes at
the expense of long-term ones. It is important to note though that the predictions in this
section cannot be extrapolated blindly to other countries. Differences in the immigrant mix
in terms of countries of origin and prospects of assimilation across immigrant groups can
56The dominant role of the preference for education in driving the medium-run results is reminiscent of
the work by Albornoz-Crespo et al. (2011). These authors stress that immigrants may self-select in terms of
their preference for education, which has important implications for their effect on the school system that
potentially surpass the effects of income. Our finding is also related to the discussion on the reasons behind
the educational success of Asian immigrants in the United States (Goyette and Xie (1999), Hsin and Xie
(2014)).
57Recall that because many private schools are Catholic, preference parameters {γm} are likely influenced
by the religious preferences of each group. In fact most African immigrants in Spain are Moroccan, an
eminently Muslim country. From this point of view an additional policy to promote assimilation would be
to require subsidized private schools to shed off religious content, or to give equal weights to the religions of




Classical analyses of the economic effects of immigration imply a net aggregate economic
gain for the native population (Berry and Soligo (1969)), often referred to as the immigration
surplus. However, the economic consequences of immigration are much less clear-cut in
setups where important public policies may respond endogenously to immigration.
Eventually whether immigration delivers a net gain or loss will vary on a case by case
basis, as a function of the characteristics of the immigrant population, and the size and
design of the welfare state in the host country.58 From this viewpoint the contribution of
our paper is to analyze in detail a setup where the main public policy is the government’s
spending in compulsory education. We have provided a quantitative assessment of the effects
of immigration in such a setup, taking into account that the immigrant population is not a
monolithic entity. Rather, it is composed of groups that differ in many relevant dimensions.
We have also tailored our model to Spain’s education system, which is characterized by a
large subsidy to private schools and, not surprisingly, a large share of the student body
enrolled in private schools.
We find that immigration will lead to a large increase in public enrollment in the short
run, together with a significant reduction in public education spending and a similarly sized
increase in the share of native households using private schools. Depending on assimilation,
these trends will be greatly intensified or mitigated once immigrants naturalize and gain
the right to vote.59 The long-run effects span a wide range of outcomes, including a large
drop in public education spending per student followed by an intense native flight toward
private schools if assimilation is non-existing or limited.
Our findings have important consequences for income inequality. They strongly suggest
that, in the absence of intense assimilation, public schools will experience important pres-
sures to teach larger numbers of students with smaller budgets. In addition the student
body in these schools will be increasingly characterized by low-income, immigrant house-
holds. As a result, the quality of public education is likely to deteriorate, along with the
58In his classical piece, Freeman (1986) argued that large-scale immigration may be incompatible with the
main welfare state policies. For a partially diverging view, see the political-economy model in Ortega (2010)
where immigration is needed in order to sustain income redistribution policies.
59It is also possible that some of these effects materialize faster, since immigrants may influence politicians
through means other than voting. Foresighted politicians may start courting the sympathy of the soon-to-be
voters already prior to naturalization (Ortega (2005)).
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chances of immigrant children to attend college and to succeed in the labor market.
Our analysis also has implications for the design of education policy. First, it should be a
priority to promote educational investments among the immigrant population. Specifically,
useful steps in this direction include the dissemination of information regarding the returns
to education, adopting policies aimed at reducing labor-market discrimination, and making
private schools more attractive to immigrants of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable 2000 2008 Change
GDP 100 173 73%
Real GDP 100 132 32%
Population (working-age) 27,324,284 31,410,915 14.95%
Foreign-born share (%) 3.64 13.10 9.46
Number of households 1 9,469,548 12,762,903 34.78%
Share (100)
Native households 97.03 86.19 -10.84
Immigrant households2 2.97 13.81 10.84
Europe 1.38 5.09 3.71
Africa 0.79 2.62 1.84
America 0.61 5.62 5.01
Asia and Oceania 0.19 0.48 0.29
Average household income 3 17,796 euros 28,391 euros 59.54%
Native households . 28,715 euros .
Immigrant households . 26,364 euros .
Share of students in public schools 0.66 0.70 0.04
Natives 0.66 0.65 -0.01
Immigrants 0.77 0.83 0.06
Europe 0.69 0.82 0.13
Africa 0.89 0.90 0.01
America 0.77 0.80 0.03
Asia and Oceania 0.67 0.75 0.08
Overall public spending in education / GDP4 (%) 2.70 2.93 0.23
Public schools / GDP 2.24 2.39 0.15
Subsidy to private / GDP 0.46 0.54 0.09
Notes: (1) Estimated on the basis of the Labor Force Survey. (2) Europe includes all countries in the
European continent except for Spain. America includes North, Central and South America. (3) Average
household income computed using the Family Expenditure Survey for year 2008 at current prices (nominal
income) with adjusted number of household from the Spanish Labor Force Survey. It includes salary, capital
income and benefits. We multiplied the monthly income by 14 (12 months and double pay in August
and December). (4) Overall public spending in education here covers pre-university education (preschool,
elementary, secondary and special education) and includes the subsidies to private schools.
41
Table 2: Calibration parameters
(1) (2)
Specification Main Higher cost immig.




γ0 (Native) 0.52 0.48
γ1 (Imm. Europe) 0.16 0.17
γ2 (Imm. Africa) 0.12 0.13
γ3 (Imm. America) 0.21 0.22






Notes: Specification (1) assumes identical cost of education for all 5 groups, and subsidy equal to spending
per student in public schools. Specification (2) assumes that the cost of education for immigrants is 10
percent higher than for natives. Specification (3) refers to the opting-out model. Here there is no subsidy
for private schools. The implied price-elasticities (in absolute terms) are 0.53, 0.54, and 0.58, respectively.
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Table 3: Model predictions - Validation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Natives 2008 2008 2000 2000 2000a
Immigrants 2008 2008 2000 2000 2008
Data Model Data Model Model
Implicit tax rateb (%) 5.93 5.93 5.99 5.83 6.08
Public school students per 100 households 24.88 24.88 30.29 27.83 27.98
Natives 19.67 19.67 29.06 26.59 23.92
Immigrants
Europe 1.55 1.55 0.28 0.31 1.50
Africa 1.16 1.16 0.54 0.52 0.83
America 2.31 2.31 0.27 0.26 1.61
Asia and Oceania 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.12
Ratio public-private household income 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.68 0.73
Share of the students in group in public schools (%)
Natives 64.67 64.67 65.97 60.36 61.12
Immigrants
Europe 81.89 81.89 69.13 76.76 79.19
Africa 89.53 89.53 89.21 86.28 85.01
America 79.78 79.78 77.27 74.44 76.92
Asia and Oceania 75.39 75.39 67.04 72.50 67.82
Public education spending per studentc (euros) 4,582 4,582 2,337 2,276 3,948
Quality of public educationd 4,582 4,582 2,337 2,276 3,948
Notes: (a) In column 5 the number of native households is the same as in year 2008, but the household
size distribution is that of year 2000. The immigrant population is taken from the data for year 2000,
both in number of households and in terms of the distribution of household size; (b) The implicit tax rate
is equal to the overall public spending on education over aggregate household income; (c) Total public
expenditure in education (including subsidy to private schools) divided by the enrollment in public and
subsidized (concerted) private. Both the numerator and denominator refer to all pre-university education
levels. In our model it coincides with the education services per student in public schools; (d) We define the
quality of public education as the number of education units per student received in public schools. The
cost of one education unit equals one for natives and pm for immigrants of group m. In this table pm = 1
for all groups.
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Table 4: Counterfactual Experiments: Immigration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification Data Main Main Main No Subsidy No Subsidy
Immigrant population 2008 2000 None None 2008 2000
Relative cost immigrants . 1 1 1.10 1 1
Implicit tax rate1 (%) 5.93 5.90 5.88 5.87 5.20 5.13
Public school students 24.88 23.62 23.19 23.32 31.85 30.71
per 100 households
Natives 19.67 22.52 23.19 23.32 25.87 29.46
Immigrants
Europe 1.55 0.28 0 0 1.78 0.32
Africa 1.16 0.46 0 0 1.27 0.50
America 2.31 0.24 0 0 2.71 0.28
Asia and Oceania 0.18 0.13 0 0 0.22 0.15
Share of the students
in public schools (%)
Natives 64.67 65.43 65.71 66.08 85.05 85.61
Immigrants
Europe 81.89 81.84 . . 93.80 93.77
Africa 89.53 89.83 . . 97.79 97.96
America 79.78 79.95 . . 93.48 93.57
Asia and Oceania 75.39 78.57 . . 91.81 94.17
Public education spending 4,582 4,727 4,783 4,774 4,635 4,779
per student2 (euros)
Quality of public education3 4,582 4,727 4,783 4,774 4,635 4,779
Pct. chg. quality of . 3.17% 4.38% 4.18% 1.15% 4.30%
public education4
Notes: Income distribution is fixed at 2008 level across all specifications. In column 1, the immigrant population is as in
the data for year 2008. In columns 2 and 5, the immigrant population is as in the data in year 2000. In columns 3 and
4 we assume that there are no immigrants. (1) The implicit tax rate is equal to the overall public spending on education
over aggregate household income; (2) Total public expenditure in education (including subsidy to private schools) divided by
the enrollment in public and subsidized (concerted) private. Both the numerator and denominator refer to all pre-university
education levels. In our model it coincides with the education services per student in public schools. (3) We define the quality
of public education as the number of education units per student received in public schools. The cost of one education unit
equals one for natives and pm for immigrants of group m. (4) This is the change in the average education services per student
between the value in the corresponding column and the value in the first column (actual in 2008) as a percent of the value in
the first column.
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Table 5: Counterfactual Experiments: Naturalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification Data Main Main No Subsidy
Immigrant population 2008 2008 2008 2008
Relative cost immigrants . 1 1.10 1
Implicit tax rate1 (%) 5.93 5.50 5.55 4.75
Public school students per 100 households 24.88 24.25 24.33 31.33
Natives 19.67 19.03 19.10 25.40
Immigrants
Europe 1.55 1.56 1.56 1.76
Africa 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.26
America 2.31 2.33 2.33 2.69
Asia and Oceania 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.22
Share of the students in public schools (%)
Natives 64.67 62.54 62.77 83.49
Immigrants
Europe 81.89 82.29 82.45 93.03
Africa 89.53 88.87 88.99 97.40
America 79.78 80.29 80.47 92.61
Asia and Oceania 75.39 74.92 75.12 90.79
Avg. education spending per student2 4,582 4,230 4,195 4,302
Quality of public education3 4,582 4,230 4,268 4,302
Pct. chg. quality of public education4 . -7.68% -6.86% -6.10%
Notes: The immigrant population and the income distribution are kept fixed at their 2008 level. The
counterfactual in columns 2-4 assumes that all immigrants gain the right to vote. (1) The implicit tax
rate is equal to the overall public spending on education over aggregate household income; (2) Total public
expenditure in education (including subsidy to private schools) divided by the total enrollment (public and
subsidized private). Both the numerator and denominator refer to all pre-university education levels. (3)
Analogous to (2) but now in terms of the education units received by each student. (4) This is the change
in the average education services per student between the value in the corresponding column and the value
in the first column (actual in 2008) as a percent of the value in the first column.
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Table 6: Counterfactual Experiments: Assimilation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Assimilation None Income Demographic Preference Complete
Implicit tax rate1 (%) 5.50 5.50 5.47 5.93 5.88
Public school students per 100 households 24.25 24.04 23.26 24.18 23.19
Natives 19.03 19.16 19.32 19.67 19.99
Immigrants
Europe 1.56 1.47 1.45 1.32 1.18
Africa 1.15 1.08 0.80 0.99 0.61
America 2.33 2.15 1.56 2.02 1.30
Asia and Oceania 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.11
Share of the students in public schools (%)
Natives 62.54 62.99 63.52 64.67 65.71
Immigrants
Europe 82.29 77.46 81.00 69.57 65.71
Africa 88.87 83.23 86.12 76.55 65.71
America 80.29 74.29 78.78 69.73 65.71
Asia and Oceania 74.92 69.32 71.78 71.99 65.71
Avg. education spending per student2 4,230 4,307 4,398 4,581 4,783
Quality of public education3 4,230 4,307 4,398 4,581 4,783
Pct. chg. quality of public education4(%) . 1.81 3.97 8.30 13.07
Notes: The number of immigrant households is kept fixed at the 2008 level. The cost of educating the child
of an immigrant family is assumed to be the same as for a native family. Throughout all columns we assume
that all immigrants vote. (1) The implicit tax rate is equal to the overall public spending on education over
aggregate household income; (2) Total public expenditure in education (including subsidy to private schools)
divided by the total enrollment (public and subsidized private). Both the numerator and denominator refer
to all pre-university education levels. (3) Analogous to (2) but now in terms of the education units received
by each student. (4) This is the change in the average education services per student between the value
in the corresponding column and the value in the first column (main specification assuming immigrants
naturalize but do not assimilate) as a percent of the value in the first column.
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Table 7: Counterfactual Experiments: Summary Table
Public spending Enrollment public Pct. share Natives
Scenario per student (Euros) Millions students in Public Schools
Immigration as in 2000 4,727 2.13 65.43
Benchmark (Immigration as in 2008) 4,582 2.51 64.67
Naturalization 4,230 2.43 62.54
Assimilation 4,783 2.55 65.71
Rel. chg. Rel. chg. Chg.
Decomposition Effects (pct of Benchmark) (pct of Benchmark) p.p.
Effect of Immigration -3.2% 15.1% -0.8
= Benchmark - Immig. As in 2000
Effect of Naturalization -7.7% -3.3% -2.1
=Naturalization - Benchmark
Effect of (Full) Assimilation 12.1% 4.9% 3.2
=Assimilation - Naturalization
Combined Long-Run Effects
No Assimilation -10.8% 11.8% -2.9
=Effect Immig. + Effect Natz.
Full Assimilation 1.2% 16.7% 0.3
=Effect Immig. + Effect Natz.+Effect Assim.
Notes: The benchmark scenario is computed on the basis of the immigrant population and income dis-
tribution in year 2008. The immigration as in 2000 scenario has the same income distribution as in the
benchmark but immigration is as in year 2000. The naturalization scenario has the same income distribu-
tion and immigration as in the benchmark, but all immigrants are granted the right to vote. The assimilation
scenario assumes that immigrants have been naturalized and have the same income distribution, household
size distribution and preference parameters as natives. In all cases we focus on the main model, featuring
the subsidy to private schools and assuming an equal cost of education for the children of natives and of
immigrants. Relative changes in columns 1 and 2 are computed as the difference between the Euro amount
in the two scenarios involved, divided by the Euro value in the benchmark (4,582 Euros).
47
Table 8: Counterfactual Experiments: Selective Immigration Policy
Horizon Short run Short run Medium run Medium run
Outcome Public Share Natives Quality Public1 Public Share Natives Quality Public1
Units % Euros % Euros
Benchmark 64.67 4,582 62.54 4,230
All European 65.16 4,676 62.76 4,271
All African 64.16 4,489 61.67 4,091
All American 64.27 4,509 62.74 4,258
All Asian 64.24 4,504 63.52 4,384
Naturalization no no yes yes
Assimilation no no no no
Notes: The short-run benchmark scenario is computed on the basis of the immigrant population and income
distribution in year 2008, assuming immigrants cannot vote. The medium-run benchmark is the naturaliza-
tion scenario, where immigrants vote but keep their characteristics fixed at their 2008 values. In all cases we
focus on the main model, featuring the subsidy to private schools and assuming an equal cost of education
for the children of natives and of immigrants. (1) Public spending per student is our measure of quality of
public education.
Table 9: Immigrant Characteristics by Group
Group Children1 Household Preference for Rel. frequency
Income2 education3 Households4
Natives 0.35 1 0.52 0.87
All Foreign-born 0.46 0.92 0.23 0.13
All Europeans 0.37 0.93 0.16 0.05
All Africans 0.49 0.85 0.12 0.03
All American 0.52 0.94 0.21 0.05
All Asians 0.52 0.93 0.39 0.01
Notes: (1) Number of school-age children obtained from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) survey. (2)
Household income normalized by native household income. Data sources are the Family Expenditure Survey
for year 2008 with adjusted number of household from the Spanish Labor Force Survey. (3) Refers to param-
eter γ in the utility function. The value for the foreign-born population as a whole is the weighted average
of the four groups of immigrants, not the result of calibration. (4) The relative frequency of households by
birth origin in year 2008 from the Labor Force Survey.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
town size bins
Natives Foreign-born
Age 65 or younger
2008 Population shares by town size
Notes: Data for year 2008 from the Population Registry. Municipality of residence is reported in 10 cate-
gories, ranging from smallest to largest: 1-100 inhabitants (bin 1), 101-200 inhabitants (bin 2), ..., 10,001-
20,000 inhabitants (bin 9), and province capitals (bin 10). The latter range in population from 35,000 to 3
million.
49









































































































0 100000 200000 300000
Chg. FB
Change in Native Population 2000-2008
Notes: The top panel in the figure contains the 52 Spanish provinces. The bottom panel excludes the two
provinces that attracted the largest numbers of immigrants (code 8 for Barcelona and 28 for Madrid). In
the bottom panel the slope coefficient is 0.30, statistically significant at the usual significance levels.
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Figure 3: Percentage change in the student-teacher ratio between 2000 and 2010 against
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Pch. student-teacher ratio in public schools
Notes: In linear regression fit each region is weighted by its year-2000 population. Next we list all regions
(autonomous communities) and their numerical code: Andalucia (1), Aragon (2), Asturias (3), Balearic
Islands (4), Canary Islands (5), Cantabria (6), Castilla Leon (7), Castilla La Mancha (8), Catalonia (9),
Valencia (10), Extremadura (11), Galicia (12), Madrid (13), Murcia (14), Navarra (15), Basque Country




In this appendix, we provide further detail on the data sources and the construction of our
variables.
The number of households in each group (Labor force Survey), enrollment by type of
school (Ministry of Education), the income distribution at the household level (Family
Expenditure Survey and National Immigrant Survey), and public spending in education
(Ministry of Education).
The Family Expenditure Survey (hereafter FES) contains income data but only identifies
immigrant households from year 2006 onward. In addition, the level of disaggregation of
the immigrant population is very limited. To overcome this limitation we also use the 2007
National Immigrant Survey to compute household income for each immigrant group. We
provide more detail in Appendix B.
A.1 Household distribution
The distribution of households is estimated on the basis of the micro-data from the Spanish
Labor Force Survey using the appropriate weights. We only include households headed by
individuals age 65 or younger.
A.2 Income distribution
Our primary source of information for income distributions is the Family Expenditure Sur-
vey (FES). This survey reports monthly household income, which includes labor income,
capital income, and government cash benefits. To produce an annual value we multiplied
monthly income by 14 to take into account double the widespread double-pay in August
and December. Prior to year 2006 the FES did not identify immigrant households. From
2006 onward it includes a variable reporting on the nationality of the household head. How-
ever, this variable provides very little disaggregation of the immigrant population. Thus
we use the 2007 National Immigrant Survey (NIS) to compute the average and standard
deviation of household income for each of our four immigrant groups (European, American,
African and Asian) by the number of children in the household. Since it only surveyed the
immigrant population, the NIS did not provide information on the native population. One
additional difference between the two surveys is that the FES reports household income
whereas the NIS reports the income of one individual chosen randomly in each household
and thus does not always correspond to the household head. We make some adjustments
to the NIS data to make it more consistent with the income data in the FES. The details
of our imputation are reported in Appendix B.
A.3 The share of public and private school students
Our model is tailored to compulsory education. Thus it is natural to focus on enrollment
in primary and secondary education. Specifically, our enrollment variables include the fol-
lowing education levels: preschool, elementary, compulsory secondary education (known as
E.S.O. in Spanish), non-compulsory secondary education (both the so-called ‘bachillerato’
and occupational training i.e. ‘formation profesional’), and special education. The enroll-
ment data are provided by the Ministry of Education and made publicly available on their
website.60
60http://www.mecd.gob.es/horizontales/estadisticas/no-universitaria.html. Specifically, the files referring
to pre-university education studies, ‘Alumnado. Regimen General’.
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Breakdown of Foreign Student Population by Continent of Origin is available only for all
school levels together (infantil, primary, secondary part1, secondary part2, bachillerato and
FP). Disaggregation of the data by levels is not available in the Ministerio Tables. We know
that primary+ESO accounted for 68.76 percent of the total enrollment of foreign students
in 2008. Since breakdown by origins is unavailable, we use this information to map total
enrollment of foreigners into total enrollment in primary+ESO. We are ignoring that this
rate may apply differently to different immigrant groups.
Throughout our paper private schools refer to the sum of subsidized (concerted) private
schools and non-subsidized private schools. The number of students in public schools for
each group m in the column 1 of the Table 3 is estimated using the data of total number of
children and the actual share of public school students for each group m. Specifically, the
household distribution ht(n,m) and the total number of household provide the total number
of children for each m, and the number of public school students is obtained from this total
number of children multiplied by the actual share of public school enrollment for each m
provided by provided by the Ministry of Education. This adjustment is important to make
it consistent with the overall number of children implied by our household distribution and
the share of public (and private) school students in the model.
A.4 Education expenditure
The information on public spending in education is obtained from the Statistics on Public
Education Expenditure produced by the Ministry of Education. We report spending for
the pre-university education levels: preschool, elementary, compulsory secondary education
(known as E.S.O. in Spanish), non-compulsory secondary education (both the so-called
‘bachillerato’ and occupational training i.e. ‘formation profesional’), and special education.
B Imputation of income distributions
For our calibration and simulation exercises we need to obtain income distributions for each
population group (m = 0 for natives, 1 for European immigrants, 2 for African immigrants,
3 for American immigrants, and 4 for immigrants from Asia and Oceania.
We firstly calculate the mean and the coefficient of variation of household income, condi-
tional on number of children and on immigration status from NIS. Secondly we calculate the
average income for immigrants from the FES. This is the average income of all immigrants,
so we want to disaggregate it for each immigration status (i.e., m = 1, 2, 3, and 4).61 Note
that there is the following relationship between the average income from the FES and the
mean income from the NIS:
ȳimm =
1




where ȳimm is the average income of all immigrants calculated from the FES, hm is the
number of households with immigration status m, and ȳm is the average income of type m
households calculated from the NIS.
However, we suspect that our measure of household income based on the NIS is an
underestimate. Hence we estimate the mean income consistent with the relative income
among the four types of immigrants as follows. Let ŷm denote the estimate of mean house-
hold income of immigrants with type m. We impose a condition that ŷm relative to any







61Income distribution for natives can be calculated directly from the FES.
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for all m and n. Without loss of generality, set n = 1. Replacing ȳm with ŷm in this
equation, we obtain the following expression:
ȳimm =
1































for m = 1, 2, 3, 4. These estimates of mean income for each m generate weighted mean
income consistent with that from the FES.
The standard deviation of household income for each m is estimated using the coefficient
of variation. Let σ̂m denote an estimate of standard deviation of household income with
type m. We obtain this estimate by:
σ̂m = cvmŷm (18)
for m = 1, 2, 3, 4 where cvm is the coefficient of variation for type m calculated from the
NIS.
We impute income distributions for each region using the same method described above.
In the imputation of regional income distribution, we allow regional variation of average
household income for natives and immigrants, but we impose the two conditions that the
coefficient of variations are same for all regions, and that relative mean income among
immigration status is constant across regions.
B.1 Alternative measure of spending per student in public schools
In our tables we report the ‘actual’ public education spending per student (for pre-university
education, that is, pre-school, elementary, secondary and special education). This is the
overall public spending in pre-university education (including the subsidy to concerted
schools) over the enrollment in public schools plus the enrollment in concerted schools.
Note that the denominator includes all students that receive public financing, either di-
rectly because they attend public schools or indirectly through the subsidy received by
their private schools.
Alternatively, we can report the actual spending per student in public schools, where the
numerator includes only spending directly used to finance public schools (thus excluding the
subsidy to private schools) and the denominator is the enrollment in public schools. This
figure is always larger because the data shows that the subsidy per student is lower than
the spending per student in public schools. The table below summarizes these variables for
year 2008.
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Table B.1: Public spending per student. Pre-university levels.
Year 2008 (pre-uni.) Overall Public schools Concerted
Public spending (109 of euros) 31.13 25.71 5.42
Enrollment (106 students) 6.95 5.01 1.95
Public spending / Enrollment (euros) 4,475 5,133 2,783
Notes: Sistema Estatal de Indicadores de la Educacion, 2012, and Enrollment general regime data. Pre-
university education includes pre-school, elementary, secondary, and special education.
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